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Those cases involving legal principles of insurance in South
Carolina during the previous year present the usual assortment
of facts and issues with few notable exceptions. By far the largest
majority of these cases relate to the problem of policy con-
struction.
Construction of Policy
The case of Miller v. Stuyvesant Ins. 6o.1 was a declaratory
judgment action brought by the appellant Miller against the
respondent company to determine the rights and obligations
of the parties under a contract of liability insurance. The facts
were that Miller and his wife owned a 1950 Ford automobile
which was identified in the subject policy. However, Miller later
transferred the title to the car to his wife, who retained the auto-
mobile from that time on. Miller himself purchased a 1955 Chev-
rolet, which he was driving when he was involved in an accident
with the appellant Greene who was made a party defendant to
this action.
The appellant Miller contended in his complaint that the 1955
Chevrolet was a substituted vehicle and as such was covered by
the insurance policy. Respondent took the position that the Chev-
rolet was a newly acquired automobile and thereby not entitled
to coverage.
Sub-section (4) of Insuring Agreement IV (a) reads as
follows:
Newly acquired automobile-An automobile, ownership
of which is acquired by the named insured or his spouse if
a resident of the same household if (i) it replaces an auto-
mobile owned by either and covered by this policy or the
company insures all automobiles owned by the named insured
and such spouse on the date of its delivery, and (ii) the
named insured or such spouse notifies the company within
30 days following such delivery date; that such notice is not
required if the newly acquired automobile replaces an owned
automobile covered by this policy. The insurance with re-
spect to the newly acquired automobile does not apply to
* Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, South Carolina.
1. 242 S.C. 322, 130 S.E.2d 913 (1963).
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any loss against the named insured or such spouse as other
valid and collectible insurance; the named insured shall pay
any additional premium required because of the application
of the insurance to such newly acquired automobile.2
Neither Miller nor his wife notified the company within thirty
days following the delivery date of the 1955 Chevrolet auto-
mobile, and neither Miller nor his wife gave notice of the acquisi-
tion of the Chevrolet prior to the date of the accident with .ap-
pellant Greene.
The South Carolina Supreme Court said that in order for
Miller to have been covered under the omnibus clause set forth
in the policy, he must have been operating the automobile de-
scribed in the policy, which he was not, or a newly acquired auto-
mobile as defined in Insuring Agreement IV(a) (4). Referring
to the pertinent policy provision, the court pointed out that there
were only two methods whereby a newly acquired automobile
would be covered under the terms of the policy; first, if it re-
placed an automobile owned by either the insured or his spouse;
or, second if the company insured all automobiles owned by the
insured or his spouse, notice was given to the company, and any
additional premium required was paid. The court held that the
first method was obviously inapplicable since Miller or his wife
retained ownership of the Ford; and the second method was dis-
pensed with on the basis that no notice was given within thirty
days as required, nor was the company ever notified of the acqui-
sition of the Chevrolet prior to the date of the accident. Further,
no additional premium was paid or offered to respondent com-
pany to cover said Chevrolet automobile.
The court adopted the following statement from American
Law Reports (Second):
It is well established that where the "automatic insurance"
clause requires notice of the acquisition of a new automobile
to be given the insurer within a specified time after deliv-
ery, the period generally being either ten or thirty days, the
failure to give notice prior to an accident occurring after
the expiration of the designated period precludes coverage
of the new automobile.3
Kingman v. Nationwide Nut. Ins. Co.4 was an action for med-
ical expenses under the family compensation clause of an auto-
2. Id. at 325, 130 S.E.2d at 915.
3. Id. at 327, 130 S.E.2d at 916.
4. 243 S.C. 288, 134 S.E.2d 706 (1963).
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mobile liability policy. Plaintiff was riding in an automobile
owned and operated by her brother when it was involved in a
collision, she suffering certain personal injuries. Her medical
expenses exceeded 2,000 dollars and she was confined indoors
for a period of sixty-four days. At the time plaintiff suffered
her injuries, Nationwide had previously issued to her brother a
policy of insurance covering the automobile in which she was
riding as a passenger. Nationwide had also issued to the plain-
tiff's husband a policy identical in terms and provisions with
that held by her brother. Both policies had a family compensa-
tion clause. According to the family compensation schedule,
which formed a part of each policy, an injured person was en-
titled to recover up to 2,000 dollars in medical expenses and five
dollars per day for continuous confinement indoors due to the
injury. Under the schedule of either policy, plaintiff was en-
titled to a total recovery not exceeding 2,300 dollars. Because
of the accident, plaintiff tried to recover the maximum amount
allowed under the family compensation schedule in both her
husband's and her brother's policies. Nationwide contended that
because of the clear non-ambiguous provisions of the identical
policies, plaintiff was not entitled to recovery under both of
them. Section D(1) of the family compensation clause of the
policies had the standard provision providing coverage for any
person who suffered injury arising out of the ownership or main-
tenance and use of the insured automobile, and section D(2)
provided coverage to the policyholder and his family arising out
of injuries sustained by being struck by another non-owned motor
vehicle while entering or leaving such a vehicle. The trial judge
refused a motion for directed verdict, holding that an ambiguity
was created by the use of the words "family compensation" in
the caption of section D, thereby raising a jury issue.
The court first held that resort may be had to a caption only
to explain an ambiguity, not to create an ambiguity where none
exists, and where the operative part of the policy is explicit, the
operative part controls. Secondly, the court held that each of the
insurance contracts limited Nationwide's obligation to plaintiff
by providing that the payments to any one person made under
D (1) and D (2) would discharge the company's liability for fam-
ily compensation "under this or any other policy." The court held
there was no ambiguity in the policies, further ruling that the
expression "any other policy" logically and obviously means any
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Johnson v. Wabash Life Ins. Co.5 involved an action on a hos-
pital insurance policy. The company had issued a hospitalization
policy to the plaintiff, agreeing to pay hospital and medical
expenses incurred, and plaintiff was subsequently hospitalized.
Wabash refused to pay the claim, alleging that the plaintiff was
hospitalized for a condition that existed prior to the effective
date of the policy and was thus not covered under the terms and
provisions of the policy. Plaintiff admitted that the illness ex-
isted prior to the issuance of the policy, but took the position
that the company had waived the provisions of the policy and
was therefore estopped from relying thereon. Plaintiff's claim
of waiver and estoppel was based upon the fact that Wabash's
agent knew of her physical condition at the time the application
for insurance was taken, and upon the further fact that after the
policy was received it was returned to the agent by the plaintiff
because prior physical conditions had not been correctly stated
in the application, the policy being later returned to the plaintiff
without any change being made therein.
The court held that insurance contracts cannot be created by
waiver. The doctrine cannot be invoked by an insured to create
a primary liability of the insurer for which all elements of a
binding contract are lacking. The court further held that a
waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, while
the essential elements of estoppel are the ignorance of the party
who invokes the estoppel, representation or conduct of the party
estopped if it misleads, and an innocent and deleterious change
of position in reliance upon such representations or conduct. The
court said there was no estoppel in this case because plaintiff had
read the policy and the application and had in fact sent the
policy back to be changed to reflect true conditions. There were
no representations which misled the plaintiff and caused her
to change her position in reliance upon such representation.
Baker v. American Ins. Co.6 was an action on an accident pol-
icy under which defendant had agreed to pay all sums for which
the insured should become legally obligated as damages because
of harm to property caused by accident, and to defend any suit
against the insured alleging such harm. American refused to
defend the suits brought against Baker for damages arising out
of grading done in connection with a construction project. Baker
settled the cases and brought this action to recover the expenses
5. 244 S.C. 95, 135 S.E.2d 620 (1964).
6. 324 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 17
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of defense and the settlement payments. The question was wheth-
er the circumstances on which the claims were made against
Baker constituted an accident within the meaning of the insur-
ance policy.
In constructing a shopping center, Baker had graded a seven-
teen-acre tract, removing the trees and vegetation therefrom.
At a time in the early part of July, 1959, when the grading was
almost completed, this area suffered unusually heavy rains. Be-
cause of the grading, the bare ground did not retard the run-off
of rainfall, with the result that the large volume of water from
the construction area overflowed onto abutting residential prop-
erties. The insured property owners sought recovery from Baker,
premised upon allegations of wilfulness and negligence in clear-
ing the construction site with respect to drainage, and the crea-
tion and maintenance of a nuisance on the construction site.
American's refusal to defend the action or to pay the compromise
amount was based upon the contention that liability did not arise
from an accident, but from the negligence of Baker.
The court stated that an accident is an unintended and unex-
pectable injurious happening. The court further stated that ordi-
narily "accident" would exclude an event caused by negligence
or nuisance alone and followed by a foreseeable or natural conse-
quence, for then neither the cause nor the effect is unexpectable.
The court reasoned, however, that the object and terms of the
subject insurance policy required the conclusion that if the negli-
gence or nuisance is accompanied by an unintended and unex-
pectable factor effectively contributing to the cause or conse-
quence of the incident, then the incident can be an "accident"
within the policy coverage. The court held that an action in the
pleadings which would require the insurer to defend does not
mean only such an "accident" as would absolutely excuse the
insured, but it refers to an "accident" which could include an
occurrence embracing negligence or nuisance. When the declara-
tions did not preclude the presence of an "accident," and if the
allegations left the answerability of the insurer in doubt, that
doubt generated a duty to defend. South Carolina does not dis-
tinguish between an accidental cause and an accidental conse-
quence, so even if the shopping center site had been negligently
cleared, the heavy rainfall was certainly an unintended and unex-
pectable factor which contributed effectively to the damage suf-




Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROINA LAw REvimw
Johnston v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n7 was an
action to recover for the loss of a hand and certain medical ex-
penses under an accident policy. Plaintiff, a South Carolina resi-
dent, was the holder of an accident insurance policy issued by
the defendant, a New York insurer. The policy was secured
through the mail, and the defendant had neither offices nor
agents in South Carolina. While the policy was in effect, plain-
tiff accidentally lost four fingers on his left hand and had his
foot severed above the ankle. The policy provided coverage of
10,000 dollars for the loss of one hand and one foot and 5,000
dollars for the loss of one hand or one foot. The policy also pro-
vided that the word "loss" as used therein in reference to the
hand or foot meant a natural severance at or above the wrist or
ankle. After the accident, plaintiff was hospitalized and subse-
quently made demand under the policy for the loss of his foot and
his hand and for medical expenses. The defendant forwarded its
draft for 5,279 dollars, denying the benefit for the loss of the
hand on the ground that the hand was not amputated at or above
the wrist. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced suit to recover for
the loss of his hand.
In addition to the policy provision defining loss of hand as
meaning actual severance at or above the wrist, defendant relied
on policy provisions which provided that no action to recover
under the policy could be brought after the expiration of two
years and that the insurance contract was to be construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York.
The court held that the foregoing policy provisions were in
conflict with the provisions of the South Carolina Insurance
Code; particularly with section 37-141,8 which states that all
contracts of insurance on property, lives or interests in this state
shall be deemed to have been made therein and subject to the
laws thereof; with section 37-456,9 which states that the loss of
a hand provision of an accident insurance policy issued in the
state shall include and mean the loss of four fingers entire; and
with section 37-474 (11),10 which provides for a six-year statute
of limitations in actions arising out of health and accident
policies.
7. 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E.2d 91 (1963).
8. S.C. CODE ANX. § 37-141 (1962).
9. S.C. CODE ANir. § 37-456 (1962).
10. S.C. CODEANN. § 37-474 (11) (1962).
[Vol. 17
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The court said that in light of section 37-141,11 it was imma-
terial where the contract was technically entered into, since South
Carolina has sufficient connection with the formation of such a
contract to demand that it conform to our Insurance Code; thus,
since the contract is subject to our insurance laws, any policy
provision inconsistent therewith is void and the pertinent pro-
visions of the statute apply and prevail as much as if expressly
incorporated in the policy.
Tyler v. United Ins. Co. of America12 was an action on a dis-
ability policy. The question was whether the plaintiff's confine-
ment was "continuous confinement within doors" so as to allow
continued insurance payments of disability benefits.
The facts were simply that, after a period of hospitalization
for heart disease, plaintiff was confined to his home; and during
said confinement plaintiff took short walks, drove to the hospital
to see the doctor and visited a neighbor occasionally. The de-
fendant argued that this violated the requirement of "continuous
confinement."
The court held, in accordance with the majority rule, that sub-
stantial confinement constituted sufficient compliance with the
provision of the policy in question. The court approved the idea
that a person may be totally incapacitated and confined to his
house within the meaning of the policy, even though he takes
some exercise outdoors or visits his physician, so long as he does
not leave his house for primarily business or personal reasons.
The validity of a loan receipt was upheld in the case of
Singletary & Son, Inc. v. Lake City State Bank,13 which in-
volved the following circumstances. Singletary's employee caused
checks to fictitious payees to be drawn on Singletary's account
with the bank and cashed them on forged endorsements. Single-
tary was insured under a fidelity bond and the surety advanced
the amount of the checks to Singletary in return for the loan
receipt by which Singletary agreed to repay the "loan" if re-
covery was made from the bank. In the action by Singletary
against the bank, the bank plead as a defense that Singletary
had been paid by its insurance company and was not entitled to
a dual recovery, and the insurance company, having been paid
to assume the risk, was not entitled to right of subrogation. The
court granted plaintiff's motion to strike this defense, pointing
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-141 (1962).
12. 243 S.C. 114, 132 S.E.2d 269 (1963).
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out that the insurance company had not been paid to protect
the bank, and holding that the loan receipt would not be regarded
as fictional.
Insurable Interest
The significant case of Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co.14 in-
volved an action against an insurer for injuries sustained by an
insured as a result of the alleged negligence on the part of the
defendant in issuing a policy of life insurance without the knowl-
edge or consent of the plaintiff insured, which situation normally
renders such a policy speculative or a wager due to a lack of
insurable interest. In the instant case, the plaintiff's wife, who
had procured the policy from the defendant, had been named as
beneficiary. She subsequently attempted to poison her husband
with arsenic in order to collect the proceeds of the insurance.
The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that in
South Carolina a wife has an insurable interest in the life of
her husband and that, therefore, the consent or knowledge of said
husband was not essential.
The court, incorporating the circuit court opinion, held that
a wife does not always have an insurable interest in the life of
her husband. Conceding that usually a wife does possess such
an interest, there are certain situations in which this is not the
case. Citing Crosswell v. Connecticut Ind. Ass'n,15 the court said:
There seems to be a clear distinction between cases in which
the policy is procured by the insured bona fide on his own
motion and cases in which it is procured by another. It is a
very different thing for a man to create voluntarily an inter-
est in his termination and to allow someone else to do so at
their will.'0
Quoting from American Jurisprudence,17 the court said:
It is a general rule that a policy of life insurance taken out
without the knowledge or consent of the insured person is
against public policy and unenforceable. A wife, for ex-
ample, cannot be permitted to obtain insurance on the life
of her husband without his knowledge and consent; such a
14. 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
15. 51 S.C. 103, 28 S.E. 200 (1897).
16. 244 S.C. 16, 21, 135 S.E. 2d 362, 364 (1964).
17. 29 Am. JuR. Insurance § 231 (1960).
[Vol. 17
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practice, it has been deemed, might be a fruitful source of
crime.' 8
In overruling another feature of the demurrer, which asserted
that there was no breach of duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, the court cited the Alabama case of Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Go. v. TVeldon:19
[Ain insurance company has a duty to use reasonable care
not to issue a policy of life insurance in favor of a bene-
ficiary who is obtaining such policy without the knowledge
or consent of the insured, and this would especially be true
where as here the company knew or had reason to know that
such was the situation. The rule against issuing policies on
the life of a person without his knowledge or consent is de-
signed to protect human life. Policies issued in violation of
this rule are not dangerous because they are illegal; they are
illegal because they are dangerous. 20
Another interesting aspect of the insurable interest principle
is raised by the case of Laurens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Home
Ins. Co.21 Here the defendant had issued a fire policy payable
to the plaintiff due to the fact that the plaintiff held the mort-
gage of one Billy Ray Adams covering the subject property.
The purpose of the policy was of course to protect the interest
of the plaintiff-mortgagee, and the mortgagor was charged for
the premium payments which the plaintiff had paid to the de-
fendant. Subsequently, Adams, the mortgagor, took out a sep-
arate fire insurance policy with another company, insuring her
personal equity in the premises. While both policies were in
effect, the dwelling was destroyed by fire.
The insurance policy issued by the company contained the
provision that:
[I]nsurance on any building covered under this policy in
excess of that fixed in the valuation clause is prohibited.
If, during the term of this policy, the insured shall have any
such other insurance, whether collectible or not, and unless
permitted by written endorsement added hereto, the insur-
ance under this policy, insofar as it applies to the building
18. 244 S.C. 16, 22, 135 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1964).
19. 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696, 61 A.L.R.2d 1346 (1958).
20. 244 S.C. 16, 25, 135 S.E.2d 362, 366 (1964).
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on which other insurance exists, shall be suspended and of
no effect.
22
It was the position of the company that under the foregoing
provision of the policy, when Adams obtained other insurance
upon the same building in excess of the amount fixed in the
valuation clause, the policy here was suspended and of no effect.
It asserted that the trial judge was in error in not so holding.
The court however, was quick to point out that the plaintiff's
policy was purchased to protect the interest of the mortgagee
association, and the other policy was to protect the interest of
the mortgagor, Adams. The court cited numerous authorities to
the effect that the association, as mortgagee, had an insurable
interest by virtue of its mortgage to the extent of the balance due
it from the mortgagor, and that where insurance was taken out
by the mortgagor, even without the knowledge or consent of the
mortgagee, it did not constitute other insurance within the pur-
view of the section referred to above. Specific reference was
made to the case of Brant v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co.23 in which it was
held that the owner of a house and a mortgagee had separate
insurable interests in the house so as to entitle the mortgagee to
recover on a fire policy insuring his interest in the house, not-
withstanding the fact that the policy contained the provision
that it would be void if there was other insurance on the prop-
erty, when in fact the owner of the house carried other insur-
ance on her interest therein.
An attempt was also made to render the contribution feature
of the policy effective, but the court, using the same reasoning,
held:
Contribution between insurers cannot be enforced unless
their policies cover the same interest. Accordingly, if an
owner and a mortgagee of the same property have procured
insurance on their separate interests therein, and the owner
seeks to recover on his policy, the defendant insurer is not
entitled to contribution against the insurer of the mort-
gagee's interest.24
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, heard
the case of Lynch v. United States Branch, Gen. Acc. Fire & Life
22. Id. at 230, 130 S.E.2d at 559.
23. 179 S.C. 55, 183 S.E. 587 (1935).
24. 242 S.C. 226, 233, 130 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1963), citing 29 Am Jur.
Inurance § 1340 (1960).
[Vol. 17
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Assur. Corp.,25 which is another case primarily concerned with
the issue of insurable interest. Here the administrators of the
estate of a deceased had recovered a judgment against one James
Alexander for the wrongful death of their intestate as a result
of an automobile collision. Alexander was driving a 1960 Chev-
rolet automobile obtained from the Bob Edwards Chevrolet Com-
pany on a conditional sales agreement. It seems that Alexander
had left his old Ford automobile, which he was trading, with
Bob Edwards Chevrolet Company, agreeing to return the next
day bringing the title certificate for the Ford and enough money
for a down payment as well. He was then allowed to drive the
Chevrolet away, although at no time did he receive any paper
title representing ownership to the Chevrolet. It later developed
that the Ford was subject to a lien amounting to its entire value.
The insurer for Bob Edwards Chevrolet Company was General
Accident, and the liability insurance carrier for Alexander was
American Casualty. After a verdict and judgment in the circuit
court this action was begun in the United States District Court,
Eastern District of South Carolina, to secure a declaratory judg-
ment to determine primary and secondary liability as between
General Accident and American Casualty.
The district court adjudged, as a matter of law, that there was
not an issue of facts to be submitted to the jury; that there was
not a sale of the Chevrolet by Bob Edwards Chevrolet Company
to Alexander; and that the Chevrolet was being used and driven
by Alexander by and with the permission of Bob Edwards Chev-
rolet Company at the time of the collision. The district court
adjudged that General Accident was primarily liable and that
American Casualty was secondarily liable. General Accident
appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals found a
wide split in the cases as to whether the purchaser of an auto-
mobile under a conditional sales contract has "sole and uncon-
ditional" ownership as required by various kinds of insurance
policies, including liability insurance. It has been held, however,
that where the prospective purchaser is in possession, he may
have an equitable title sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
"unconditional and sole ownership" and the seller may be held
to have lost his sole ownership. The court of appeals reasoned
that the sole criterion was whether or not the Chevrolet had
been sold or transferred to Alexander so as to make it an owned
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automobile under American Casualty's policy of liability insur-
ance. The court of appeals said:
We think that equitable ownership coupled with posses-
sion and the right to operate the automobile is sufficient
ownership to make the automobile an "owned" one within
American Casualty's liability insurance policy.
26
Fraud and Misrepresentation
The case of Mulkey v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.27 was
one in which the defendant had issued to the plaintiff a fire
insurance policy covering a dwelling, together with a subsequent
endorsement covering the contents thereof. While the policy
was in full force and effect, the plaintiff's dwelling and contents
were destroyed by fire. Plaintiff filed a sworn statement claim-
ing the value of the contents destroyed as 3,045 dollars. Defend-
ant declined to make payment of the claim. Thereafter. this ac-
tion was instituted in which plaintiff sought 2,500 dollars dam-
ages for the loss of contents as provided in the policy. Defend-
ant, by way of answer, plead a general denial, admitting only
the issuance of the policy, and, as separate defenses, alleged that
plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the policy in that
he had wilfully concealed or misrepresented material facts, was
guilty of fraud and false swearing, and that the fire was caused
by or at the request of the plaintiff or someone acting on his
behalf.
Upon trial, the jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of
2,000 dollars. Defendant's motions for a directed verdict, judg-
ment n.o.v., or in the alternative for a new trial or a new trial
nisi were refused, and this appeal follows.
The South Carolina Supreme Court said the exceptions pre-
sented the following general questions for determination:
1. Did Plaintiff carry the burden of proof as to the value
of the contents allegedly destroyed?
2. Did Plaintiff wilfully conceal and misrepresent material
facts or was he guilty of fraud and false swearing?
3. Did Plaintiff refuse to answer material questions during
his pre-trial examination under oath ?28
26. Id. at 332.
27. 243 S.C. 121, 132 S.E.2d 278 (1963).
28. id. at 125, 132 S.E.2d at 280.
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The court dispensed with the first exception on the ground
that although as a general rule proofs of loss are admissible to
show compliance with the provisions of the policy but are not
competent independent evidence as to the amount of loss or the
value of the property, there was testimony as to the value of the
contents destroyed independent of the proof of loss, both on di-
rect and cross-examination of the plaintiff and by defendant's
witnesses, sufficient to sustain the amount of the verdict.
The second exception contained three distinct elements, namely
that plaintiff wilfully concealed or misrepresented material facts
or was guilty of fraud and false swearing, (1) by overvaluing
the contents contained in the proof of loss, or (2) by including
in the proof of loss items of which he was not the owner, and
(3) by false swearing with regard to the existence of other
insurance. As to the first two, the court held that there was no
evidence indicating that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith
even though the jury found that the loss sustained by the plain-
tiff was 2,000 dollars when he himself had claimed the property
was worth 3,045 dollars, and even though some of the personal
clothing destroyed in the fire actually belonged to the plaintiff's
son. The third element was the allegation on the part of the de-
fendant that the plaintiff was guilty of false swearing when he
indicated there was no other insurance covering any part of the
contents upon which he predicated his claim, which the court
dismissed on the ground that the two interests which were in-
sured were separate and that therefore the condition against
additional insurance was not broken.
Defendant's third exception related to the plaintiff's refusal
to answer certain questions during his examination under oath
subsequent to the fire. The policy provided that as often as may
be reasonable the insured shall submit to examination under
oath. The two questions of which the defendant complained re-
lated to the plaintiff's police record and to where the plaintiff
kept his personal papers. The trial judge ruled that the plain-
tiff's police record was immaterial and that refusal to disclose
the whereabouts of his hiding place of his personal papers was
also immaterial in the light of further questions propounded con-
cerning papers relating to the personal property destroyed in
the fire. The court held that the questions were not material
per se to the plaintiff's claim; however, when considered in the
light of possible arson, plaintiff's whereabouts does become
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ently unaware of the possibility of arson, whereas defendant
knew of such possibility as it had obtained its investigation by
an arson expert a few days after the fire. It was the reasoning
of the court that defendant could not rely on a refusal to answer
a question which is not material on its face to avoid the policy,
when it is aware that the question is material or may become
material because of special knowledge it has acquired, and there-
by lull the insured into a violation of the cooperation clause.
Graham v. Aetna Ins. Co.29 was an action to recover upon four
insurance policies issued to the plaintiff by the four defendants,
covering a building and contents thereof in which the plaintiff
operated a restaurant.
The plaintiff alleged that he filed the required proof of loss,
cooperated completely and complied with every request of the
defendants, but that the defendants had failed to comply with
the payment provisions of the policy. The defendants admitted
issuance of the policy but brought forth evidence to the effect
that the plaintiff had received payment for a fire loss that he
had sustained in 1955 on a dwelling and its contents located on
property belonging to plaintiff approximately three or four miles
from the site of the plaintiff's restaurant. The defendants con-
tended that this constituted a breach of the following provision:
This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after
a loss, the insured has wilfully concealed or misrepresented
any material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance
or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured therein,
or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured
relating thereto.30
The defendants further alleged that had the facts of the pre-
vious loss been disclosed, the agent would not have issued the
policies to the plaintiff. Plaintiff did not admit or deny that
he had told the agent that this was the only previous loss, but
explained the unreported loss by saying: "I was talking about
that farm out there where I lived."
31
The South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that an appli-
cant has a duty to fully answer questions propounded without
evasion, misrepresentation or concealment, but that the present
record did not contain the alleged interrogatories asked of the
29. 243 S.C. 108, 132 S.E.2d 273 (1963).
30. Id. at 110, 132 S.E.2d at 274.
31. Id. at 112, 132 S.E.2d at 275.
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plaintiff by the agents of the insurer, only his purported an-
swers, and without some evidence of the actual questions pro-
posed, it was impossible to determine precisely whether the
plaintiff's answers were false or were mistakenly made in good
faith. The court further held that ordinarily, in the absence of
fraud, failure of an insured to disclose a fact with reference to
which no questions are asked is not such concealment as will void
a policy, and, as has been stated, where the company asks no
information and the insured makes no representations, the in-
sured being asked nothing may presume that nothing as to the
risk is desired from him. "Mere silence on the part of the assured
as to a matter not inquired of is not to be considered such a con-
cealment as to void the policy."32
Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co.33 involved an action to
recover on a life policy alleging fraudulent breach of contract
accompanied by fraudulent acts. A policy issued on the life of
plaintiff's husband had a face value of 5,000 dollars and pro-
vided two additional death benefits. The first benefit was called
a "Bonus Participation Fund," and the second benefit provided
for a full refund of premiums. The dispute arose primarily out
of the refund of premium benefit because the return of premium
rider listed the annual premium at 200 dollars, whereas the an-
nual premium on the face of the policy was listed at 213 dol-
lars. The insurance company contended the return of premium
benefit was not meant to include thirteen dollars which was
added to the premium for disability and double indemnity
provisions.
The basis of the claim for punitive damages was the company's
statements concerning the full amount due under the policy. It
first told plaintiff that 5,096 dollars was owing. After inquiry
by the Insurance Commission, the company told the Commission
that 7,296 dollars was the amount due. Then the company
later told plaintiff that 6,371 dollars was due. It was held and
affirmed that plaintiff was entitled to actual and punitive
damages.
The company maintained there was nothing showing a fraudu-
lent intent or a fraudulent act but that the erroneous offer was
arrived at through mistaken calculations. The South Carolina
Supreme Court held that tort liability exists for false statements
32. 243 S.C. 108, 113, 132 S.E.2d 273, 275 (1963), citing 45 C.J.S. Insmrance
§ 473 (3) (1946).
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which, though made without actual knowledge of falsity, are
made in a manner or under such circumstances that knowledge
of falsity is imputed to the person making representations. False
statements made recklessly, and without knowing or caring
whether they are true or false, will support a fraud and deceit
action. The company's conduct in attempting to settle the claim
for less than the amount quoted to the Insurance Commission,
an amount it was in a position to know was incorrect, is evidence
from which fraud can be legally inferred.
Termination of Policy
Spencer v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. 34 was an action for
death benefits under a group policy. In the lower court, there
was a directed verdict against the insurer which had issued a
group policy for Florence County and its employees on February
1, 1961. The wife of the respondent, who was a county employee,
died on February 2, 1961. There was a standard provision in the
application and in the policy that if the employee was not ac-
tively at work full time when the policy was issued, then the pol-
icy would not be effective as to that person until they returned
to work full time. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
the lower court in ruling that the insurer was estopped to assert
this provision. It was argued that the court erred in admitting
testimony relating to estoppel, since such estoppel was not plead,
and further that the court was in error in admitting parol testi-
mony tending to vary the provisions of the contract. The court
said that estoppel was different from waiver, and that estoppel
in pais need not be plead unless required by statute. The court
further held that while the contract may have been ambiguous,
there was no necessity in pursuing that question, since the evi-
dence admitted was for the purpose of proving estoppel.
It was further argued that coverage could not be extended by
waiver or estoppel. The court said that where estoppel exists, an
insurer may be precluded from asserting that the loss was not
within the terms of the policy.
The case of Burns v. Prudence Life Ins. Co.3 5 was one in
which the insured gave a check for a premium on a life policy
and was promptly notified of dishonor of the check. The insured
applied for reinstatement and tendered the same check, which
was again dishonored. The insurer held the check until the time
34. 243 S.C. 317, 133 S.E.2d 317 (1963).
35. 243 S.C. 515, 134 S.E.2d 769 (1964).
[Vol. 1i"
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss1/13
165]INSURANCE SURVEYED
of the trial; at no time was there sufficient money in the bank
to cover it. The court held that the check was not uncondition-
ally accepted even though a receipt by the insurance company
was issued and the insurer was not negligent in its failure to
notify the defendant in the nine day period from the time of
dishonor until the death of the insured. The court further held
that physical retention of the check under the circumstances did
not constitute a waiver of the forfeiture of the policy since there
was no inference that the check was held by the insurer other
than for the purpose of evidence that the premium was not paid.
Surety Indem. Co. v. EstesH3 involved an insured who paid his
premium on an automobile liability policy with a check that was
dishonored because of non-payment of an item which the insured
had previously deposited in his account. The insured then
brought the account up to a figure sufficient to pay the premium
check upon presentment within the grace period.
The court stated that this was a continuing policy of insurance
and the question presented was whether the insured had forfeited
his rights under that contract. In holding that the contract had
not been forfeited, the court stated that the check was not ac-
cepted as absolute payment, but on condition that it would be
paid on proper presentment. According to the court, the failure
of this condition did not result in forfeiture since the grace
period had not expired, and a tender of the check at any moment
before such expiration would suffice to prevent forfeiture. Since
there were sufficient funds and the condition was met, there was
no forfeiture.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Austin,37 was an action under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act"8 to determine whether the Guar-
anty Insurance Exchange had in force a valid liability policy
which had been issued to one Roy Dalton. The latter had bor-
rowed from his county bank money for a premium on the liabil-
ity policy which was paid in full to Guaranty. Upon being in
arrears in payment of installments, a notice of cancellation of
the policy was sent to Dalton by the agent of Guaranty, a Mr.
Cothran, which notice Dalton never received.
The court held that Guaranty had no right to cancel the policy
since the premium had been paid in full for the entire year and
the insurer had no interest in installment payments. Any agree-
36. 243 S.C. 593, 135 S.E.2d 226 (1964).
37. 225 F. Supp. 523 (W.D.S.C. 1964).
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ment between the agent and Dalton to cancel the policy upon
default in the installment payments was void and unenforce-
able as against public policy, since it was in violation of the laws
of the State of South Carolina. Also, there was no authority
granted to the agent for the cancellation for this particular
policy by the insurance company. In any event, the cancellation
notice was not effective, since it was mailed to the wrong address.
In the case of Odell v. United Ins. Co. of America,39 there was
an action for disability benefits under a policy of accident and
health insurance. The defendant was in default, and therefore
this case involved only the measure of damages. The court set
out the rule for damages in an action to recover under such a
situation to be only the amount of benefits accrued up to the
point of the commencement of the action. The plaintiff contended
that the action was for damages sustained by reason of wrongful
cancellation by the defendant. The court held that the complaint
stated only an action for recovery on the policy "since under the
allegations of the complaint the attempted cancellation had no
effect upon the legal status of the policy." No cause of action
was alleged for the wrongful cancellation; therefore, the plain-
tiff could only recover for benefits which had accrued up to
the commencement of the action, and benefits thereafter must be
recovered by a subsequent action.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage
In Motors Ins. Co. v. Surety Ins. Co.,40 the question was raised
as to whether or not a collision insurer is subrogated to the
rights of the collision insured under the uninsured motorist pro-
visions of a liability policy. The court stated first that in the
common law of subrogation, in order for one to be subrogated
to the rights of another, that person seeking subrogation must
have a superior equity. The court pointed out that the appellant
(liability carrier) did not cause or contribute to the loss and that
there was no privity of contract between the respondent and
the appellant. Also, the appellant was required by law to provide
coverage under the uninsured motorist act and received no ex-
pectation of profit. The purpose of the act was to relieve insured
motorists, within specified limits, of risk of injury from tortious
acts of financially irresponsible uninsured motorists, and noth-
ing in the act was to relieve other insurers of primary responsi-
39. 243 S.C. 35, 132 S.E.2d 14 (1963).
40. 243 S.C. 487, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
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bility for their own contract, since the purpose of the act was
not to benefit them. Therefore, the court denied subrogation both
under the act and under equitable consideration.
Laird v. Nationwide Ins. 0o.41 involved a suit which was
brought under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act 42
to require payment by the insurance company of punitive dam-
ages awarded against an uninsured motorist. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, in reversing, stated:
There is no provision in the uninsured motorist act which,
either expressly or by implication, requires that the unin-
sured motorist endorsement must insure against any and all
liability.
43
In this case the court placed strong emphasis for justification
upon the rule that courts must not engage in judicial legisla-
tion.44 This decision is in general agreement with other con-
clusions in other jurisdictions. By an amendment to the South
Carolina Code, 45 this holding has been overruled so that now
an insurance company under the uninsured motorist provision
must pay both actual and punitive damages.
41. 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-701 (1962).
43. 243 S.C. 388, 396, 134 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1964).
44. Id. at 395, 134 S.E.2d at 209.
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